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Abstract. We address the problem of banking system resilience by applying off-equilibrium statistical physics to a
system of particles, representing the economic agents, modelled according to the theoretical foundation of the current
banking regulation, the so called Merton-Vasicek model. Economic agents are attracted to each other to exchange
‘economic energy’, forming a network of trades. When the capital level of one economic agent drops below a minimum,
the economic agent becomes insolvent. The insolvency of one single economic agent affects the economic energy of all
its neighbours which thus become susceptible to insolvency, being able to trigger a chain of insolvencies (avalanche).
We show that the distribution of avalanche sizes follows a power-law whose exponent depends on the minimum capital
level. Furthermore, we present evidence that under an increase in the minimum capital level, large crashes will be
avoided only if one assumes that agents will accept a drop in business levels, while keeping their trading attitudes and
policies unchanged. The alternative assumption, that agents will try to restore their business levels, may lead to the
unexpected consequence that large crises occur with higher probability.
PACS. XX.XX.XX No PACS code given
1 Introduction
The well-being of humankind depends crucially on the finan-
cial stability of the underlying economy. The concept of fi-
nancial stability is associated with the set of conditions under
which the process of financial intermediation (using savings
from some economic agents to lend to other economic agents)
is smooth, thereby promoting the flow of money from where it
is available to where it is needed. This flow of money is made
through economic agents, commonly called ‘banks’, that pro-
vide the service of intermediation and an upstream flow of in-
terest to pay for the savings allocation. Because the flow of
money that ensures financial stability occurs on top of a com-
plex interconnected set of economic agents (network), it must
depend not only in individual features or conditions imposed
to the economic agents but also on the overall structure of the
entire economic environment. The role of banking regulators is
to protect the flow of money through the system by implement-
ing rules that insulate it against individual or localised breaches
that happen when a bank fails to pay back to depositors. How-
ever, these rules do not always take into account the impor-
tance of the topological structure of the network for the global
financial stability. In this paper, we will present quantitative ev-
idence that neglecting the topological network structure when
implementing financial regulation may have a strong negative
impact on financial stability.
The event of not paying back the money owed is called
‘default’. In order that downstream defaults do not generate
Send offprint requests to:
Fig. 1. Illustration of a bank ‘apparatus’ for money flow. A bank
lends money to debtors using money from depositors and also its own
money, the capital. In return debtors pay interest to the bank, which
keeps a part to itself and pays the depositors back.
the default of a particular bank, each bank holds an amount
of money as a reserve for paying back its depositors. In other
words, a part of the money one bank sends downstream is its
own money. This share of own money is called ‘capital’ (see
Fig 1). Looking to one single bank, if it has a large amount of
capital, one reasonably expects that the bank will also cover a
proportionally large debtor default, guaranteeing the deposits
made by its depositors. On the contrary, if the capital level of
the bank is small, a small debtor default is sufficient to put the
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bank with no conditions for guaranteeing the money of all its
depositors. Loosing such conditions, the bank enters a situation
called bankruptcy or insolvency. Usually, bank regulators base
their rules in such arguments.
In 1988, a group of central bank governors called the Basel
Committee on Banking Regulation unified the capital level rules
that were applied in each of the member countries and defined
a global rule to protect the banking system that was becoming
global at the time[21]. Roughly speaking, these rules imposed
a minimum capital level of 8% without any empirical reason.
A few years later the accord came under criticism from market
agents who felt that it did not differentiate enough between the
various debtors, i.e. between the entities whom the bank lends
money, and a second version of the accord[22] was finished in
2004 to become effective in 2008. In this second version, banks
were allowed to use the Merton-Vasicek model[31] based on
the Value-at-Risk paradigm(VaR)[10] to weight the amount of
lent money in the calculation of the necessary capital according
to the measured risk of the debtor. Thus the 8% percentage was
now calculated over the weighted amount and not over the to-
tal amount. This version of the accord become effective at the
beginning of the 2008 financial turmoil; with regulators under
severe criticism from governments and the media, in 2010 the
Committee issued a new version[23] tightening capital rules.
At the same time, since the beginning of the 2000s the aca-
demic community has been very critical of the capital rules,
particularly because the VaR paradigm, on which such rules are
based, assumes that returns are normally distributed and “does
not measure the distribution or extent of risk in the tail, but only
provides an estimate of a particular point in the distribution”[7].
In fact, there is a huge amount of evidence[2,17,30,3] that
the returns of economic processes are not normally distributed,
having typically heavy tails. According to the Central Limit
Theorem[9], if returns are heavy-tail distributed, then the un-
derlying random variables have infinite variance or a variance
of the order of the system size [18]. In economic systems, ran-
dom variables are related to measurements taken from eco-
nomic agents. Thus, the infinite variance results from long-
range correlations between the economic agents. We will argue
that this single fact compromises the stability of the flow and
brings into question the effectiveness of capital level rules.
Physics, and in particular statistical physics, has long in-
spired the construction of models for explaining the evolution
of economies and societies and for tackling major economic
decisions in different contexts[29,11]. The study of critical phe-
nomena and multi-scale systems in physics led to the develop-
ment of tools that proved to be useful in non-physical contexts,
particularly in financial systems. One reason for this is that fast
macroeconomic indicators, such as principal indices in finan-
cial markets, exhibit dynamical scaling, which is typical of crit-
ical physical systems[19].
In this paper we will address the problem of the financial
stability using statistical physics models that explain the occur-
rence of large crises, in order to show that the resilience of the
banking system is not necessarily improved by raising capital
levels. Our findings have a concrete social importance, since
capital is the most expensive money a bank can provide to its
debtors. Capital belongs to the shareholders, who bear the risk
of the business and keep the job positions. So it must be re-
munerated above the money from depositors who do not bear
these risks. Consequently, more capital means more costs on
the flow of the money and, in the end, more constraints to eco-
nomic development.
We start in section 2 by describing an agent-based model[29]
which enables us to generate the critical behaviour observed in
economic systems. In section 3 we describe the observables
that account for the economic properties of the system, namely
the so-called overall product and business level[32]. Further-
more, the agent-based model as well as the macroscopic ob-
servables, are discussed for the specific situation of a network
of banks and their deposits and loans. One important property
in financial banking systems is introduced, namely the mini-
mum capital level, defined here through the basic properties
of agents and their connections. In section 4 we focus on the
financial stability of the banking system, showing that rais-
ing capital levels promotes concentration of economic agents
if the economic production remains constant and it destroys
economic production if that concentration does not occur. Fi-
nally, we present specific situations where each agent seeks the
stability of its economic production after a raise in capital lev-
els, leading to a state of worse financial stability, i.e. a state
in which large crises are more likely to occur. In section 5 we
draw the conclusions.
2 Minimal model for avalanches of financial
defaults
The model introduced in this section is based on a fundamental
feature that human beings have developed in their individual
behaviour, through natural selection, in order to be able to fight
environmental threats collectively. It is called specialisation[16],
and describes the tendency individuals have, when living in
communities, to concentrate on one, or at most a few, specific
tasks. Each individual does not need to do everything to sur-
vive, just to concentrate on a few tasks that he/she can do bet-
ter for all the other individuals. Everything else he or she will
get from other specialised elements of the community. Thus,
specialisation leads to optimisation, enabling the entire com-
munity to accomplish goals otherwise unattainable. However,
it also implies that individuals now need to exchange what they
do, so that all have everything they need for survival. The set
of all task and product exchanges between individuals is what
we usually call Economy. Consequently, when building an eco-
nomic system, a reasonable approach is to take agents which
are impelled to exchange some product through a network of
trades between pairs of agents. In this scope, let us assume that
the economic environment is composed of elementary particles
called agents and all phenomena occurring in it result from the
interaction of those particles. Let us also assume that agents are
attracted to interact, exchanging an observed quantity that takes
the form of money, labour or other effective means used in the
exchange. This type of model where the decision concerning
an exchange is made by the exchanging agents alone is called
a “free-market economy”.
We represent these interactions or trades between agents
through economic connections, and call the exchanged quan-
tity ‘economic energy’. Though the “energy” used here is not
Joa˜o P. da Cruz, Pedro G. Lind: The dynamics of financial stability in complex networks 3
the same as physical energy, we will use the term in the eco-
nomical context only. Notice, however, that human labour is
assumed to be “energy” delivered by one individual to those
with whom he/she interacts, which reward the individual with
an energy that he/she accumulates. The balance between the
labour (“energy”) produced for the neighbours and the reward
received from them may be positive (agent profits) or negative
(agent accumulates debt). For details see Ref. [6]. This analogy
underlies the model introduced in the following, where we omit
the quotation marks and consider entities more general than in-
dividual, which we call agents. Agent-based models of finan-
cial markets have been intensively studied, see e.g. Refs. [27,
29] and references therein.
Economic connections between two agents are in general
not symmetric and there is one simple economic reason for
that: if a connection were completely symmetric there would
be no reason for each of the two agents to establish an ex-
change. In several branches of Economics we have different
examples of these asymmetric economic connections like pro-
duction/consumption, credit/deposit, a labour relation, repos,
swaps, etc. In the next section, we will focus on a specific con-
nection, namely in credit/deposit connections.
Since each connection is asymmetric we distinguish the
two agents involved by assigning two different types of eco-
nomic energy. Hence, let us consider two connected agents,
i and j, where i delivers to j an amount of energy Wij and
receives an amount Eij 6= Wij in return. We call these con-
nections the outgoing connections of agent i. The connections
where agent i receives from j an amount of energy Wji and
delivers in return Eji we call incoming connections.
The energy balance for agent i in one single trade connec-
tion is, from a labour production point of view, Uij = Wij −
Eij . Having two different types of energy, we choose Wij as
the reference to which the other type Eij = αijWij is related
through the coefficient αij (see Eq. (2) below). Without loss of
generality, we consider that one connection corresponds to the
delivery of one unit of energy,Wij = 1, yielding:
Uij = 1− αij . (1)
In order to implement the model, we need to define the form
of the coefficient αij in Eq. (1), which is a connection property.
The amount of energy Eij that one agent i gets in return for a
delivered amountWij can be taken as a price which depends on
the rules of supply and demand. An agent delivering energy to
many neighbours tends to impose a higher price on them. Sim-
ilarly, an agent receiving energy from many other neighbours
will induce a reduction in the price imposed by its creditors.
These principles can be incorporated in a simple Ansatz as:
αij =
2
1 + e−(kout,i−kin,j)
(2)
where kout,i is the number of outgoing connections of agent i
and kin,j is the number of incoming connections of neighbour
j. For αij > 1 the energy provided by agent i to agent j is
‘paid’ by j above the amount of energy agent i delivers. Thus,
agent i profits from this connection and gains a certain amount
of energy, Ui > 0. For αij < 1 the opposite occurs. From
Eq. (2) one easily sees that αij is a step-function with average
value one and very small derivatives in the asymptotic limits
kin,j ≫ kout,i and kin,j ≪ kout,i. Furthermore, in this latter
limit kin,j ≪ kout,i, the value of αij could in principle be any
finite value larger than one. However, to guarantee symmetry
between the situation when agent i profits from agent j, and
that when agent j profits from agent i, we consider the range
αij ∈ [0, 2], yielding αij = 2 for kin,j ≪ kout,i.
Such energy transactions have an Economics analogue ac-
cording to basic principles[16]: a large (small) kin,j indicates
a large (small) supply for agent j and a large (small) kout,i in-
dicates a large (small) demand of agent i. Thus, the difference
kout,i − kin,j measures the balance between the demand of an
agent i and the supply of its neighbour j. αij saturates for large
positive and negative differences in order to guarantee the price
to be finite.
The definition of αij in Eq. (2) is not uniquely determined
by these economic requisites. Similar functions such as the
arc-tangent or the hyperbolic tangent have been used in this
context[26]. The main findings of this manuscript are not sen-
sitive to the choice of functional dependency of αij as long as
it is a step-function of kin,j − kout,i.
In the model described above, we disregard the economic
details of agents and connections, keeping the model as gen-
eral as possible. Still, this generalisation is not different in its
essence from the one accountants must use to provide a com-
mon report for all sorts of business, with the difference that they
use monetary units and we use dimensionless energy units.
Because each agent typically has more than one neighbour,
the total energy balance for agent i is given by
Ui =
∑
all neighbours
Uij =
∑
j∈νout,i
(1 − αij) +
∑
j∈νin,i
(αji − 1)
(3)
where j runs over all neighbours of agent i, and νout,i and νin,i
are, respectively the outgoing and incoming vicinities of the
agent.
This total energy balance Ui is related to the well-known
financial principle of net present value (NPV)[28]: When an
agent holds a deposit he or she supposedly pays for it (by def-
inition) and most (but not all) accounting standards [14] as-
sume it as a negative entry on the accounting balance. Here,
we model deposits as a set of incoming connections from the
same agent in which all associated cash-flows were already dis-
counted. In this way, if we could think of a balance sheet totally
built with NPV’s we would be near Ui.
As we noted previously, economic energy is related to phys-
ical energy in the sense that the agents must absorb finite amounts
of physical energy from the environment to deliver economic
energy. Consequently, the economic energy balanceUi of agent
imust be finite. The finiteness ofUi for each agent is controlled
by a threshold value, below which the agent is no longer able to
consume energy from its neighbours, i.e. below which it loses
all its incoming connections. Furthermore, since this thresh-
old reflects the incoming connections, it should depend on how
many incoming connections our agent has. With such assump-
tions, we introduce the quantity
ci ≡
Ui∑
j∈νin,i
(αji − 1)
(4)
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for ascertaining if the agent is below a given threshold cth
or not. We call this quantity ci the ‘leverage’ of agent i. Un-
like we did previously in Ref. [6], here Ui is divided by the
total product of the incoming connections solely and not by
the ‘turnover’. This choice is made to be in line with the way
banking regulators define leverage. Still, this alternate defini-
tion does not change the critical behaviour observed in our
model and previously reported[6]. For the case that the mean-
field approximation αij ∼ 〈α〉 holds, the leverage ci depends
exclusively on the network topology, yielding ci = kout,ikin,i −
1[6].
Leverage has a specific meaning in Economics, which re-
lated to the quantity ci: it measures the ratio between own money
and total assets[28]. Thus, each agent has a leverage ci which
varies in time and there is a threshold cth below which the agent
‘defaults’ or goes bankrupt, losing its incoming connections
with its neighbours. Since the bankrupted agent is connected
to other agents, the energy balances must be updated for ev-
ery affected agent j. Bankruptcy leads to the removal of all
incoming connections of agent i, reducing the consumption of
the bankrupted agent to a minimum, i.e. keeping one single
consumption connection, kin,i = 1. This situation implies that
agent i and its neighbours j should be updated as follows:
ci → kout,i − 1 (5a)
kout,j → kout,j − 1 (5b)
cj → cj −
1
kin,j
. (5c)
We keep the agent with one consumption connection in the
system also to avoid the divergence of ci as defined in the con-
text of financial regulation[21,22,23]. Such a minimum con-
sumption value has no other effect on the problem we will be
dealing with in the next section.
The bankruptcy of i leads to an update of the energy bal-
ance for neighbour j, which may then also go bankrupt, and so
on, thereby triggering a chain of bankruptcies henceforth called
an ‘avalanche’. See illustration in Fig. 2.
The concepts of leverage and leverage threshold are used by
R.C. Merton[20] and O. Vasicek[31] in their credit risk models,
which are the theoretical foundation for the Basel Accords[21,
22,23]. Namely, Merton assumed this threshold for pricing cor-
porate risky bonds using a limit on debt-equity ratio and Va-
sicek generalised it to a “debtor wealth threshold” below which
the debtor would default on a loan.
3 Macroproperties: overall product and
business level
Let us consider a system of L interconnected agents which
form the environment where each agent establishes its trades.
We call henceforth this environment the operating neighbour-
hood. We can measure the total economic energy of the sys-
tem by summing up all outgoing connections to get the overall
product UT , namely
UT =
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈Vout,i
(1− αij), (6)
Fig. 2. Illustration of a bankruptcy avalanche. Each arrow points to
the agent for which it is an incoming connection. Any agent in the
economic environment is part of a complex network (1), and is sus-
ceptible to go bankrupt, which will destroy its incoming connections
(2). Consequently, new energy balances must be updated for the af-
fected neighbours, whose leverage can go over the threshold(3). Since
these neighbours also have neighbours of their own, connection will
continue to be destroyed until all agents again have a leverage above
the threshold.
where Vout,i is the outgoing vicinity of agent i, with kout,i
neighbours. The quantityUT varies in time and its evolution re-
flects the development or failure of the underlying economy. In-
stead ofUT , we consider the relative variation dUTUT , also known
as ‘return’ in a financial context. We can also measure the av-
erage business level per agent, defined as the moving average
in time of the overall product:
Ω =
1
L
1
TS
∫ t+TS
t
UT (x)dx (7)
where TS is a sufficiently large period for taking time averages.
Similar quantities are used in Economics as indicators of indi-
vidual average standard of living[32]. In the continuum limit,
the time derivative of the business level Ω gives the overall
product uniformly distributed over all agents.
At each time step a new connection is formed, according
to the standard preferential attachment algorithm of Baraba´si-
Albert[1]: For each connection created one agent is selected us-
ing a probability function based on its previous outgoing con-
nections, expressed as
P (i) =
kout,i∑L
l=1 kout,l
(8)
and one other agent is selected by an analogous probability
function built with incoming connections. Such a preferential
attachment scheme is associated with power-law features ob-
served in the Economy long ago[24,13] and is here motivated
by first principles in economics that agents are impelled to fol-
low: an agent having a large number of outgoing connections
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is more likely to be selected again to have a new outgoing con-
nection, and likewise for incoming connections.
As connections are being created, a complex network of
economic agents emerges and individual leverages (see Eq. (4))
are changing until eventually one of the agents goes bankrupt
(ci < cth) breaking its incoming connections and changing the
leverage of its neighbours, who might also go bankrupt and
break their incoming connections and so on. See Fig. 2. This
avalanche affects the total overall product, Eq. (6), because the
dissipated energy released during the avalanche is subtracted.
This total dissipated energy is given by the total number of bro-
ken connections, and measures the ‘avalanche size’, denoted
below by s. Since the avalanche can involve an arbitrary num-
ber of agents, and is bounded only by the size of the system, the
distribution of the returns dUT
UT
will be heavy-tailed, as expected
for an economic system. See Fig. 5 below.
Until now we have been dealing with generic economic
agents that make generic economic connections between each
other. No particular assumption has been made besides that
they are attracted to each other to form connections by the
mechanism of preferential attachment and that the economic
network cannot have infinite energy. From this point onward,
we will differentiate some of these agents, labeling them as
‘banks’. To this end we fix the nature of their incoming and out-
going connections: The incoming connections are called ‘de-
posits’, the outgoing connections are called ‘loans’. We should
emphasize that we are not singling out this kind of agent from
the others. Banks are modelled as economic agents like any
other. We have only named its incoming and outgoing connec-
tions, which we could also do for all the remaining agents, as
consuming/producing, salary/labour, pension/contribution, etc,
to model every single business we could think of. We are choos-
ing this particular kind of agent because banks are the object of
banking regulation and the aim of financial stability laws.
The threshold leverage cth for one bank represents its ‘min-
imum capital level’. The capital of one bank is really an amount
of incoming connections, which are equivalent to deposits, be-
cause shareholders are also economic agents. This means that
the ‘minimum capital level’ in the model will be much higher
than in real bank markets because we are disregarding share-
holders and adding the remaining energy deficit to fulfill cth.
Therefore, we cannot map directly the levels obtained in the
model onto the levels defined in banking regulation. We can,
however, uncover the behaviour of economic agents in scenar-
ios difficult to reproduce without such a model.
4 Raising the minimum capital level
In this section we use the model described above in different
scenarios, i.e. for different sizes of the operating neighbour-
hood and different minimum capital levels. From Eq. (4) one
sees that the leverage of one agent is always larger than −1.
Since we deal with bankruptcy we are interested in negative
values of cth, which reduces the range of leverage values to
[-1,0]. Our simulations showed that a representative range of
values for both the threshold and the size L of the operating
neighbourhood is [−0.72,−0.67] and [500, 2000] respectively.
For each pair of values (L, cth) the system evolves until a total
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
UT
Reference
Constant L
2e+05 4e+05 6e+05
t
8e+05
Fig. 3. (Colour online) Illustration of the effect of raising the mini-
mum capital level on the overall product UT , at constant L = 1500.
Raising cth from −0.71 (solid line) to −0.69 (dotted line) does not
significantly change the overall product.
Fig. 4. (Colour online) Illustration of the effect of raising the minimum
capital on the business level at constant L = 1500. Raising cth from
−0.71 (solid line) to −0.69 (dotted line) decreases the business level
from Ω = 2.88 to Ω = 2.75.
of 1.5×106 connections are generated. We discard the first 105
time-steps which are taken as transient.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the evolution of the overall prod-
uct UT and business level Ω for a situation in which the min-
imum capital level is raised, while keeping the size of the op-
erating neighbourhood constant. The solid line shows the ini-
tial situation with lower minimum capital level and the dashed
line the final situation with higher minimum capital level. From
Fig. 3 we can see that if the size of the operating neighbour-
hood is kept constant, the quasi-stationary level of the overall
product does not significantly change.
Following this observation we next investigate the evolu-
tion of the return distribution for UT , considering an increase
of the minimum capital level at constant size L of the operat-
ing neighbourhood.To this end we compute the cumulative size
distribution of avalanches, i.e. the fraction Pc(s) of avalanches
of size larger than s. Numerically, the size s of an avalanche is
found by summing all connections destroyed during that avalanche.
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Fig. 5. Avalanche (crises) size distributions for different scenarios
of minimum capital level, keeping the operating neighbourhood un-
changed for each agent. The different distributions match at small
sizes, in the region where the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) holds,
and deviate from each other for larger crises (critical region). In the
critical region one observes (inset) that increasing the minimum capi-
tal level decreases the probability for a large avalanche to occur, which
supports the intentions of the Basel III accords. However, in this sce-
nario one assumes that each bank will have a simultaneous decrease
of their business level (see text and Fig. 4). A more natural scenario
would be one where each bank reacts to the rise in the minimum cap-
ital level in such a way as to keep its business level constant, which
leads to a completely different crises situation (see Fig. 8).
The value ofPc(s) is then obtained by identifying the avalanches
whose size is greater than s.
Figure 5 shows the cumulative size distribution of avalanches
for different minimum capital levels, keeping L = 2000. For
small avalanche sizes, the Central Limit Theorem holds[18]
and thus all size distributions match independently of the min-
imum capital level. For large enough avalanches (‘critical re-
gion’), the size distributions deviate from each other, exhibit-
ing a power-law tail Pc(s) ∼ s−m with an exponentm that de-
pends on the minimum capital level cth (inset). As expected[5],
the exponent found for the avalanche size distribution takes val-
ues in the interval 2 < m < 7/2.
As can be seen in the inset of Fig. 5 the exponent increases
in absolute value for larger minimum capital levels, indicating
a smaller probability for large avalanches to occur. However,
this scenario occurs only when the size of the operating neigh-
bourhood is kept constant and, as shown in Fig. 4, the increase
of the minimum capital level is also accompanied by a decrease
of the business level. This means that each agent has less eco-
nomic energy or, in current language, is poorer.
Assuming that agents do not want to be poorer despite reg-
ulatory constraints, and therefore try to keep their business lev-
els constant (Fig. 6), a natural reaction against raising the mini-
mum capital level is to decrease the number of neighbours with
whom the agent establishes trade connections, i.e. to decrease
the size of the operating neighbourhood (Fig. 7). In Economics
this is called a concentration process[8], which typically occurs
when the regulation rules are tightened up. In such a scenario
Fig. 6. (Colour online) Unlike in Figs. 3 and 4 it is possible to raise the
minimum capital level cth from −0.71 (solid line) to −0.69 (dashed
line), while keeping the business level constant. In the case plotted,
Ω ∼ 2.88
.
Fig. 7. (Colour online) Keeping the business level constant at Ω ∼
2.88 and raising the minimum capital level from −0.71 (solid line) to
−0.69 (dashed line) leads to a decrease of the operating neighbour-
hood, which is reflected in a lower overall product.
where the size of the operating neighbourhood is adapted so as
to maintain the business level constant, the distributions plot-
ted in Fig. 5 are no longer observed. In particular, the exponent
m does not increase monotonically with the minimum capital
level as we show next.
Figure 8a shows the critical exponent m and the business
level per agent Ω as functions of the minimum capital level cth
and the operating neighbourhood size L. For easy comparison,
both quantities are normalized in the unit interval of accessible
values.
The critical exponent shows a tendency to increase with
both the minimum capital level and the operating neighbour-
hood size. The business level, on the other hand, decreases
when the minimum capital level or the neighbourhood size in-
crease. Considering a reference state F0 with cth,0, L0 and Ω0
there is one isoline of constant minimum capital level,Γ 0cth , and
another of constant operating neighbourhood size, Γ 0L, crossing
at F0. Assuming a transition of our system to a larger mini-
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Fig. 8. (Colour online) (a) Normalized critical exponent m¯ and busi-
ness level Ω as functions of the minimum capital level cth and sys-
tem size L. For an initial financial state F0, an increase of the mini-
mum capital level takes the system along one of the infinitely many
paths between the initial and final isolines at constant minimum cap-
ital level, Γ 0cth and Γ
f
cth
respectively. (b) If such a path follows the
isoline at constant system size, Γ 0L, the critical exponent increases and
thus the probability for large avalanches decreases. Simultaneously
however, its business level decreases (Ωf < Ω0), which runs against
the natural intentions of financial agents. On the contrary, if the path
is along the isoline at constant business level, Γ 0Ω , as one naturally
expects the financial agents would do, the critical exponent does not
change significantly, meaning that large financial crises may still occur
with the same probability as before (see text).
mum capital level at isoline Γ fcth while keeping L constant, i.e.
along the isoline Γ 0L, one arrives at a new state FL with a larger
critical exponent, which means a lower probability for large
avalanches to occur, as explained above. However in such a sit-
uation the new business levelΩf is lower than the previous one
Ω0.
On the contrary, if we assume that the transition from F0
to the higher minimum capital level occurs at constant business
level, i.e. along the isoline Γ 0Ω , one arrives to a state FΩ on the
isoline Γ fcth for which the critical exponent is not necessarily
smaller than for the initial state.
From economical and financial reasoning, one typically as-
sumes that, independently of external directives, under unfavourable
circumstances economical and financial agents try, at least, to
maintain their business level. This behaviour on the part of
agents leads to a situation which contradicts the expectations
of the Basel accords and raises the question of whether such
regulation will indeed prevent larger avalanches from occurring
again in the future. To illustrate this, Fig. 8b shows a close-up
of the m-surface plotted in Fig. 8a.
For the reference state F0 one finds an exponentm = 2.97±
0.18. An increase of the minimum capital level at constant op-
erating neighbourhood size (state FL) yields m = 3.34± 0.09,
while increasing the minimum capital level at constant business
level (state FΩ), yields m = 2.79 ± 0.09, which corresponds
to a significantly higher probability that large avalanches will
occur.
5 Discussion and conclusion
In summary, raising the minimum capital levels may not nec-
essarily improve banking system resilience. Resilience may re-
main the same if banks go after the same business levels, as
one should expect, according to economic reasoning. Indeed,
since business levels are part of the achievement of any eco-
nomic agent that enters a network of trades, each agent will
try, at least, to maintain this level, independently of regulatory
constraints.
Furthermore, our findings can solve the apparent contradic-
tion between the credit risk models that serve as the theoretical
foundation for bank stability accords and the definition of cap-
ital levels. In fact, bank stability accords impose on banks an
adapted version of Merton-Vasicek model[31] in which it is as-
sumed that each agent has a leverage threshold above which it
defaults on credit. The assumption of this threshold combined
with a first principle of Economics – that the Economy emerges
from the exchanges between agents – naturally leads to an in-
terplay between agents that can propagate the effect of one de-
fault throughout the entire economic system.
Economic systems have long-range correlations and heavy-
tailed distributions that are not compatible with a linear as-
sumption that raising individual capital levels will lead to stronger
stability. Because of the interdependency, this assumption is
probably valid only in two situations: when it is impossible
for an individual to default; and when individuals behave in-
dependently from each other (random trade connections). Both
situations do not occur in real economic systems.
These findings can inform the recent governmental mea-
sures for dealing with the effects of the 2008 financial crises.
In particular, governments have shown[23] a tendency for im-
posing a higher capital investment from banks. If the threshold
is increased, while the total amount of trade remains constant,
there will be fewer trade connections between the banks and
their clients, which leads to smaller avalanches in the evolution
of the financial network. On the other hand, if the total amount
of trade is assumed to grow, following the rise in minimum
capital, the probability of greater avalanches will also increase
to the level where it was before or even to a higher level.
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The scale-free topology of the economic network plays a
major role in the determination of the size distribution of the
avalanches. At the same time, the scale-free topology emerges
naturally from the rules introduced, which are motivated by
economic reasoning, namely the principles of demand and sup-
ply. Still, one could argue that for bank regulation purposes, a
different (imposed) topology for the connections between fi-
nancial agents would help to prevent large crises. For exam-
ple, if the economic network is structured as a random Erdo¨s-
Re´nyi network[33], in which every economic agent has the
same probability of being chosen to form an economic connec-
tion, the system would not have avalanches. In such a model,
since connections are equally distributed throughout the sys-
tem, all agents would have statistically the same balance. In
other words, for each bankruptcy the expected number of child
bankruptcies in the avalanche would have either zero size or
the size of the system. Thus, with Erdo¨s-Re´nyi topology, one
expects still the danger of triggering such a large chain of in-
solvencies able to collapse the entire system.
Directives more oriented to the connection topology emerg-
ing in the financial network could be a good alternative. Inter-
estingly, although controversial, our claims point in the direc-
tion of IMF reports in November 2010[25], where it is argued
that rapid growth in emerging economic periods can be fol-
lowed by financial crises, and also to recent theoretical stud-
ies on the risk of interbank markets[15,12]. Indeed the recent
IMF Memorandum on Portuguese economic policy[4] already
includes directives that reveal IMF’s concern not only with tun-
ing capital buffers and other local properties but also with mon-
itoring the banking system as a whole, and in particular keep-
ing track of the financial situation of the largest banks in the
network. We believe that such global networking measures are
much more trustworthy than local ones.
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